Inclusion of Uncertainty in Environmental Impact Assessment in Greenland by Larsen, Sanne Vammen
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 2001, vol. 86, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2021.106583  
 
Inclusion of Uncertainty in Environmental Impact Assessment 
in Greenland 
 
Associate Professor Sanne Vammen Larsen, The Danish Centre for Environmental Assessment, Aalborg 
University 
Abstract: Uncertainty is an inherent part of impact assessment (IA), and can vary in type and source. 
However, according to previous research, uncertainty is rarely explicitly acknowledged and handled in IA, 
indicating that it is a challenging issue in practice. This paper adds to the current research body a study of 
EIA in Greenland, which includes a document study of EIA reports as well as white papers and summaries 
from public hearings. The study findings are in line with previous results, finding a limited explicit 
acknowledgement of uncertainty, although uncertainty is indicated through implicit language use. The 
study also finds that various tools are applied, which could be used for handling uncertainty, including 
sensitivity analysis, monitoring and worst-case estimates. However, often these tools are not used 
systematically, and it is not transparent whether they are targeted at handling uncertainty. Regarding the 
examination of materials from hearing processes, there is little evidence that uncertainty is part of the 
discussions. These results initiate discussions of how choices of whether and how to acknowledge and 
handle uncertainty are made, and how consciously participants in the process make these choices.  
1 Introduction: Impact Assessment as a tool for integrating uncertainty in decision-
making 
Impact Assessment (IA) can be defined as “the process of identifying the future consequences of a current 
or proposed action” (IAIA, 2009 p. 1). The purpose of IA is to promote sustainable development by 
providing science-based information on the possible impacts of a proposed action to decision-makers as 
well as the public. Thus, mitigation and monitoring of impacts and promoting transparency and 
participation in the process are important parts of IA. (IAIA, 2009) As indicated by the definition cited 
above, IA aims to predict “future expected consequences of possible decision” (IAIA, 2009, p. 1). This focus 
on the process before a potential activity is approved and implemented means that uncertainty is an 
inherent part of the IA process, and one that warrants attention in research and practice (see e.g. Tennøy, 
Kværner and Gjerstad, 2006; European Commission, 2013; Leung et al., 2015; Bond et al., 2015) The fact 
that uncertainty challenges science-based instruments, such as IA, is stressed by the understanding put 
forward among others by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990; 2005) that “in many contemporary complex science-
related policy issues, uncertainty significantly limits the degree to which science can provide objective, valid 
and reliable knowledge”(Wardekker et al., 2008, 630). 
1.1 Uncertainty in impact assessment 
Uncertainty has been associated with various parts of the IA process including the baseline, impact 
prediction, cumulative impacts, impact mitigation and impact management. This has been derived both 
from empirical studies of EIA practice as well as legal provisions or guidance for dealing with uncertainty 
(European Commission, 2013; Lees et al., 2016; Pavlyuk et al., 2017). 
The nature of uncertainty encountered in IA can be described in many ways. For instance, Zhu et al. (2011) 
in their study of uncertainty in SEA, distinguishes between internal uncertainty related to the plan or 
project assessed and external uncertainty related to the surrounding natural and social environment. 
Walker et al. (2003) in relation to decision support tools, such as IA, distinguishes between epistemic 
uncertainty related to a lack of knowledge, and variability uncertainty related to inherent variability. An 
important distinction is that uncertainty in IA can be related not only to knowledge but also to values, 
emphasising the human and societal dimension which is changeable (Walker et al., 2003; De Jongh, 2000). 
The nature of uncertainty is important for practice because depending on the nature of uncertainty, 
different approaches for handling it in IA will be relevant. For example, epistemic uncertainty might be 
minimised by gathering more knowledge, while variability uncertainty often will not.  
Another relevant dimension of uncertainty in IA is the sources of uncertainty. Walker et al. (2003) 
conceptualise locations of uncertainty in model-based decision support, context uncertainty, model 
uncertainty, input uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and model outcome uncertainty. Tennøy, Kværner 
and Gjerstad (2006) based on empirical studies of EIA find that sources of uncertainty are model errors, 
errors in baseline data, input data and assumptions. Also, based on an empirical study of EIA, Larsen (2014) 
identified sources of uncertainty as shown in Table 1. 
Source Description 
Design and technology Uncertainty about the final project design and the choice of technology 
Construction Uncertainty about timelines and methods for construction 
Data Uncertainty about data used as a basis for calculations, prediction and 
assessments e.g. because of questionable data collection or natural variability 
Calculations and models Uncertainty about the specific methodology, assumptions etc. for models and 
calculations of impacts 
Causal mechanisms Uncertainty about what the derived consequences of predicted impacts are 
Values Uncertainty about society’s values e.g. expressed through attitudes, classifications 
or goals  
Related activities Uncertainty about the status of related projects, plans and activities etc.  
Table 1 Sources of uncertainty in EIA (Larsen, 2014) 
As exemplified by the brief review presented here, both on location, nature and source of uncertainty in IA, 
there is no common framework for research and practice in IA. This lack of a common framework, e.g. 
common typologies and terminology, has been highlighted as problematic and a worthwhile aspect of a 
future agenda for research and practice (see Leung et al., 2015; Lees et al., 2016).  
1.2 Dealing with uncertainty in impact assessment 
IA can potentially provide information about uncertainties for use in decision-making. However, as 
suggested by Larsen, Kørnøv and Driscoll (2013), there are multiple possible pathways for dealing with 
uncertainty, including first whether uncertainty is (implicitly or explicitly) acknowledged or not by actors in 
the process. Second, if uncertainty is acknowledged, there is a question of whether uncertainty is actively 
handled or not (Larsen, Kørnøv and Driscoll 2013). To handle uncertainty in IA, various tools have been 
suggested and documented, including scenarios, monitoring, adaptive management, applying likelihoods 
and the precautionary principle (De Jongh, 2000; European Commission, 2013; Azcárate et al., 2013; Bond 
et al., 2015; Lees et al., 2016).  
Studies of practice have shown that acknowledging and handling uncertainty is a major challenge for IA and 
that uncertainty is most often not explicitly acknowledged and handled in IA reports (see e.g. Tennøy, 
Kværner and Gjerstad, 2006; Larsen, Kørnøv and Driscoll, 2013; Lees et al. 2016). As an example of the 
implications of this, a study of IA of hydrocarbon activities in the Disco Bay, Greenland found “that 
environmental change has been insufficiently analyzed in planning processes, leading stakeholders to 
endorsing hydrocarbon development based on information that may underreport uncertainty and the 
extent of potential harm” (McDowell and Ford, 2014). As the quote highlights, if uncertainty is not explicitly 
acknowledged, impact predictions appear more certain than they are, which may influence decisions and 
impede the ability of stakeholders to identify and demand resilient solutions (see also Wardekker et al., 
2008). It also indicates another possible pathway for dealing with uncertainty, namely analysis, the benefits 
of which are pointed out by Walker et al. (2003, p. 6) stating that “uncertainty is a fact of life, and a better 
understanding of the different dimensions of uncertainty and their implications for policy choices would be 
likely to lead to more trust in scientists providing decision support, and ultimately to better policies.”  
Based on the above, three main possibilities for dealing with uncertainty can be put forward: 
• Acknowledging uncertainty - basically stating its existence 
• Analysing uncertainty – analysing uncertainty e.g. through applying predetermined scales or 
performing sensitivity analysis   
• Handling uncertainty – actively doing something about uncertainty e.g. reducing uncertainty, 
improving resilience or securing robustness 
The acknowledgement of uncertainty can be either explicit, using direct wording of uncertainty, or more 
implicit, e.g. as suggested by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990) presenting a range of results, characterising the 
methodological acceptability of results, or acknowledging ignorance about the system studied.  
1.1 Problem statement 
The relevance of uncertainty for IA and the expedience of attention to uncertainty in IA research is also 
reflected in the fact that recent years have seen the amount of published research focussed on uncertainty 
in IA increase (Leung et al., 2015). There has been a variety of studies published concerning uncertainty and 
IA (Leung et al., 2015), however, as stated by Lees et al. (2016), relatively few studies exist that examine the 
actual IA practice of acknowledging and handling uncertainty. This paper aims to contribute to this field by 
adding a study of IA practice in the Arctic. 
A search in the Scopus database for the search terms ‘Impact Assessment’ OR ‘Environmental Assessment’ 
AND ‘Arctic’ AND ‘Uncertainty’ yielded only a few studies that touch upon uncertainty in IA in the Arctic 
(see e.g. McDowell and Ford, 2014; Azcárate et al., 2013), leaving the topic relatively unexplored. The 
relevance of adding knowledge about uncertainty in EIA in the Arctic is emphasised by the fact that the 
Arctic is facing possible significant changes, e.g., due to:  
• Climate change, which alters the natural environment and entails both challenges and possibilities  
• Developments in the global economy and market conditions e.g. related to minerals and 
hydrocarbons 
Such issues render the Arctic environmental, economic and social development as changing and uncertain 
(see e.g. Nakashima, 2012; Emmerson and Lahn, 2012; Koivurova and Lesser, 2016; Larsen et al., 2019). The 
changing context has implications e.g. on different extractive industries and tourism, and as a consequence, 
on large-scale developments, such as resource extraction activities and infrastructure construction. When 
working and assessing such developments in an uncertain context, it is expedient to acknowledge and work 
with uncertainty, striving to understand complex systems, to build communities that are thriving and 
resilient regardless of the development in external drivers (see e.g. Hansen and Larsen, 2014; Arctic 
Council, 2016).  
Across the Arctic, EIA is a pivotal tool used to support decision-making, although the specific regulations 
vary (Koivurova and Lesser, 2016; Hansen and Larsen, 2016). EIA is used as part of planning large-scale 
projects with severe impacts on their surroundings, such as mining and infrastructure projects (Hansen, 
Larsen and Noble, 2017). The focus of this paper is EIA of large-scale projects in Greenland to shed light on 
EIA practice in an Arctic nation and add experiences from this region to the building of knowledge on 
uncertainty in IA. Greenland has two separate sets of legislation for EIA, one for projects under the law on 
mineral resources, such as mining and oil and gas projects, the other broadly covers remaining projects 
(Koivurova and Lesser, 2016). 
Two specific issues will be explored in this paper through general discussions and examining how these are 
reflected in EIA practice in Greenland:  
• Is uncertainty acknowledged in EIA processes and how? 
• Which tools and approaches are used to deal with uncertainty in EIA processes? 
Regarding the EIA process, this study entails looking at the practice reflected in the EIA report, as well as 
what input the involved parties provided in the hearing process. As stated in section 1.1, there is a lack of 
and a need for a common framework for research and practice in IA, e.g. common typologies and 
terminology on uncertainty (see Leung et al., 2015; Lees et al., 2016). This study aims to contribute to this 
issue through a partly inductive approach suggesting a typology for sources of uncertainty based on the 
empirical study results guided by the research questions above.  
The paper is structured as follows: the methodology is provided in section 2, the results are presented, 
structured by the two research questions, in sections 3 and 4, with section 5 discussing and drawing the 
conclusions. 
2 Methodology 
In order to contribute to exploring the questions posed above, three Greenlandic EIA processes (Table 2) 
were selected based on the following criteria: 
• Geography: securing cases from different geographical areas of Greenland while focusing on areas 
with a local population 
• Status: securing cases in different stages of the project process from preparation to operation 
• Legislation: securing at least one case which has been processed according to each of the two sets 
of EIA legislation in Greenland 
Name (based on the location of 
the project) 
Killavaat Alannguat  Ilulissat Aappaluttoq 
Project type Mine Airport Mine 
Year of publication of EIA report 2013 2018  2014 
Status Awaiting approval Under construction In operation 
Region South Greenland Northwest Greenland West Greenland 
Table 2 EIA processes selected for the study 
The mine at Killavaat Alannguat will produce concentrates of various minerals and rare earth elements but 
after the EIA process in 2013, the application for a production licence was rejected due to lack of 
documentation. Since then, the mining company Tanbreez Mining Greenland A/S has gathered additional 
documentation, and according to an update in March 2020, there are plans for a renewed EIA process and 
negotiations (Government of Greenland, 2020). The ruby mine at Aappaluttoq started operation in 2017 
after receiving its licence in 2016 (Greenland Ruby n.d.). The airport in Ilulissat is part of a larger plan for 
the renewal of airports in Greenland, the construction of which started in January 2020 (Kalaallit Airports, 
2020). For each of these EIA processes, a document study was conducted as described in the following 
section. 
2.1 Document study 
The following documents were studied for each of the three EIA processes: 
• The EIA report 
• Responses sent in by various participants during the public hearing 
• Minutes from public meetings held during the public hearing 
It should be noted that for the airport in Ilulissat, only one response was received during the hearing, and 
there are no minutes available from the public meeting held, thus, there is very little material available 
concerning the public hearing of this EIA process. The project in Ilulissat falls under the broad Greenlandic 
legislation on EIA in the Environmental Protection Act. The legislation demands a hearing period of 8 weeks 
when the EIA is published, during which, the public should have access to comment and respond to the 
project. After the hearing, the Minister of Environment and Nature can demand changes to the project. 
There are no legal demands for responding to the hearing, but a white paper is published for some 
projects. For EIA under the legislation for mineral extraction projects a white paper is mandatory. 
Each EIA report and document from the public hearings were reviewed by first looking for 
acknowledgement of uncertainty. For the hearing documents, this takes the form of looking for instances 
where the participants address uncertainty e.g. by pointing it out or asking for it to be handled. Lees et al. 
(2016) point out the challenges of data collection and analysis of information on uncertainty from IA 
documents because of the lack of consistent terminology, thus, a search for specific words to find 
uncertainty is not deemed expedient, rather, the whole document is examined. Furthermore, for each 
occurrence of uncertainty, the issues stated in Table 3 have been recorded. The data gathered for each EIA 
process was then analysed, summarised and compared to determine various categories which are 
described later in the paper. 
Document EIA reports Hearing documents 
Issues recorded Whether the uncertainty is 
acknowledged explicitly or implicitly  
Whether the uncertainty is 
acknowledged explicitly or implicitly 
The source of uncertainty The source of uncertainty 
Whether the uncertainty is assessed 
or analysed (as opposed to merely 
mentioned) 
Whether there are demands for 
assessment or analysis of 
uncertainty 
Whether any tools are used to 
handle the uncertainty 
Whether there are demands for 
handling uncertainty 
Table 3 Issues recorded for each occurrence of uncertainty in the documents studied 
3 Uncertainty in the EIA process 
In the following subsections, the results concerning whether and how uncertainty is acknowledged in the 
EIA reports and hearings are presented, in accordance with the first research question. 
3.1 Uncertainty in the EIA reports 
First, regarding the EIA reports, the report from Ilulissat contains an explicit acknowledgement of 
uncertainty, for example: “Possibly the noise limits should be lowered to 50 dB in areas with vulnerable 
species, because higher noise levels can have a negative influence. However, there is uncertainty concerning 
the effect in different habitats, since some species show a high degree of tolerance to noise” (Kalaallit 
Airports A/S, 2018, p. 65; emphasis added by author). More often though, explicit acknowledgement of 
uncertainty is not phrased in those words, rather in another form, for example: “To what extent the low 
water flow in Lakseelv during mid-winter will cause the concentration of lead to exceed the GWQG value 
after 3-5 years of operation is unknown” (Tanbreez, 2013, p. 80; emphasis added by author). 
The report from Aappaluttoq does not contain any explicit acknowledgements of uncertainty. However, 
this report as well as the other two contain examples where uncertainty is not acknowledged but there are 
implicit indications of uncertainty, for example: “The mine infrastructure seems to be able to avoid any 
conflicts with the cultural heritage sites“ (True North Gems, 2014A, p. 5; emphasis added by author).  
These findings, as well as inspiration from Tennøy, Kværner and Gjerstad (2006), Pavlyuk et al. (2017) and 
Lees et al. (2016), leads to dividing the findings of uncertainty in the documents into three categories: 
A) The explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty using the word ’uncertainty’ or variations e.g. 
’uncertain’ or ‘not certain’ 
B) Explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty not using the word ‘uncertainty’ or variations, but using 
other words such as ’unknown’ or ‘unclear’ 
C) Implicit indication of uncertainty using words such as e.g. ‘seems’, ‘probably’, ‘expected’ or 
‘typically’. 
The results are summarised in Table 4, presenting the categories of acknowledgement found, and how 
many occurrences have been registered for category A and B. For category C, there are too many and too 
varied occurrences for quantification. 
EIA process Killavaat 
Alannguat  
Ilulissat Aappaluttoq 
A) Explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty 
phrased as ‘uncertainty’ 
No (0) Yes (2) No (0) 
B) Explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty not 
phrased as ‘uncertainty’ 
Yes (3) Yes (10) No (0) 
C) Implicitly indicated uncertainty Yes Yes Yes 
Table 4 Whether and how uncertainty is acknowledged in EIA reports from the three EIA processes  
Direct comparison with results from Lees et al. (2016) and Tennøy, Kværner and Gjerstad (2006) is difficult 
since the frameworks or typologies differ. The analytical frameworks of both previous studies have 
categories that are a mix of the issue of implicit/explicit acknowledgement and the quality or depth of 
describing and analysing uncertainty, whereas the typology presented here has implicit/explicit 
acknowledgement as a separate issue and adds category C implicitly indicated uncertainty, which is also 
found by Lees et al. (2016) although it is not part of their analytical framework.  
Compared with the results from Lees et al. (2016), who found an equal amount of explicit (corresponding 
to category A) and implicit (corresponding to category B and C) uncertainties, this study clearly found fewer 
occurrences of category A explicit acknowledgements. The results of Tennøy, Kværner and Gjerstad (2006) 
are more similar to those presented here, as most EIA reports studied either did not mention uncertainty 
or did not refer to it specifically as uncertainty. It is interesting to note this difference, and it leads to 
several questions; if the practice of acknowledging uncertainty differs significantly between countries, then 
which factors influences this practice? Is it factors such as e.g. different legislation, culture or planning 
systems? 
In the reports from Killavaat Alannguat and Ilulissat, uncertainty is acknowledged in relation to setting the 
baseline as well as the assessment of impacts. This echoes the findings of Lees et al. (2016), who found that 
most of the disclosed uncertainty was associated with impact prediction.  
In the EIA reports, the uncertainties explicitly acknowledged have different discernible sources (referring to 
Table 1) as reported in Table 5. 
EIA process Killavaat 
Alannguat  
Ilulissat Aappaluttoq 
Design and technology X X X 
Construction  X  
Data  X X X 
Calculations and models X  X 
Causal mechanisms X X X 
Values X   
Related activities  X  
Table 5 The sources of the uncertainties acknowledged in the EIA reports 
Based on the data and analysis, the typology is adjusted and another category is added; implementation, 
meaning whether the project and mitigation measures are implemented in the way it has been 
presupposed in the assessment. The issue of not knowing whether implementation will be entirely as 
assumed is pointed out as a source of uncertainty in the EIA reports and hearing documents. 
3.3 Uncertainty in the hearing 
Looking at the material from the hearings, only one of the participants explicitly points to uncertainty 
(category A). In the written hearing for the mine at Killavaat Alannguat, uncertainty concerning wind data 
wind is pointed out: “If the measurements are compared to the nearest official climate stations for the 
period and the last 10 years…the measurements look sensible but based on our long-time experience with 
wind measurements in Greenland, I know that this type of measurements is subject to major uncertainties” 
(Jakobsen, 2013, p. 3; emphasis added by author).  
In both Killavaat Alannguat and Aappaluttoq, uncertainty is indicated by asking for more information and 
further studies. For example, from Aappaluttoq: “Before an actual approval is given, it should be examined 
whether there are problematic substances and compounds in the rock” (True North Gems, 2014B, p. 179). 
Also, “In this regard, NEKA want a quantification of how large a part of the water flow comes from Fostersø 
in the winter period, since this has a great effect on the magnitude of the lead concentration the trout are 
exposed to” (Department of Nature, Environment and Climate, p. 1).  
In Killavaat Alannguat, participants also questioned the data and data collection, asked for documentation 
for claims and transparency regarding the premises. For example, “…in general there is a lack of access to 
the background data and calculations in the form of technical appendices, giving independent experts and 
NGOs the possibility to access the conclusions of the report” (KANUKOKA, 2013, p. 1-2).  
Unfortunately, only one hearing response was available for Ilullissat Airport (as stated in section 2.1), in this 
response, mainly factual mistakes are corrected.  
4 Handling uncertainty in the EIA process 
In the following subsections, the results concerning whether and how uncertainty handled in the EIA 
reports and hearings are presented to address the second research question. 
4.1 Handling uncertainty in the EIA reports 
First, as to whether uncertainty is actively assessed or analysed, the report from Killavaat Alannguat 
contains a systematic declaration of the confidence level for the assessment of each impact, focussed on 
whether or not there is confidence in the data which forms the basis for assessment. A set scale was used 
as described in Table 6. 
Levels on the 
scale 
Description of level No. of instances where the confidence is 
assessed as on the specific level of the scale 
Low Data is weak 0 
Medium  Data from Greenland or other parts of the 
Arctic (in particular Canada) points to 
conclusion 
3 
High Data from the study area or neighbouring parts 
of South Greenland are conclusive 
15 
Table 6 Description of the scale used to declare the confidence level in data in the Killavaat Alannguat EIA process 
It is not clear which actions, if any, medium confidence in the data prompts. Findings from Lees et al (2016) 
show examples of similar practice with various assessments of confidence in data, but no further discussion 
or handling of any of the results. The EIA process of Killavaat Alannguat also includes an assessment of the 
probability/likelihood that the impact will occur using a scale: improbable, possible, probable and definite. 
However, it is not very clear how this assessment was conducted and how the levels on the scale were 
defined.  
In Killavaat Alannguat and Aappaluttoq, various methods to try to analyse and reduce the sensitivity of 
results to uncertainty were used. For example, two different methods were used for an estimation, in order 
to determine whether they match and consolidate the results in Aappaluttoq: “The water balance of the 
lake has been calculated by two different methods…the two methods are in good agreement” (True North 
Gems, 2014A, p. 28-9), and three sets of limit values from the EU, Norway and Canada were used to assess 
the significance of the impact from dust in Killavaat Alannguat. 
Regarding whether any tools were used to handle uncertainty, a monitoring programme was applied in 
both Killavaat Alannguat and Aappaluttoq. For Aappaluttoq, “A comprehensive environmental management 
plan and monitoring program ensure the emerging and unforeseen problem will be handled in a timely and 
appropriate manner” (True North Gems, 2014A, p. 59). In general, there are no clear links between 
uncertainty and the use of monitoring, as also found by Lees et al. (2016). For example, none of the three 
issues with medium confidence in data (see Table 6) were covered by the monitoring programme in 
Killavaat Alannguat. An exception is that in Killavaat Alannguat, where mitigation measures were 
suggested, in case monitoring showed that specific limit values for the water environment were exceeded, 
an issue which was highlighted as uncertain (True North Gems, 2014A, p. 80). 
Examples are found of working with a worst-case estimate of impacts, implicity in Killavaat Alannguat and 
explicitly in Ilulissat. Regarding Ilulissat, “The assessments are based on the available information 
concerning the project and its activities in the construction and operation phases, and the assessments of 
environmental impacts are worst-case assessments. In the detailed planning of the project, the design and 
activities will be specified, and thus the real environmental impacts may prove to be less than assessed in 
the present report” (Kalallit Airports, A/S 2018, p. 48).  
One example shows a mix of reducing uncertainty via further studies and applying the precautionary 
principle until the results are available: “Until further studies prove it environmentally safe to dispose of the 
remains in local landfills or sewer systems, the waste will be shipped for further processing and disposal 
outside Greenland” (True North Gems, 2014A, p. 5). 
The results found here, echo the results from Lees at al. (2016), who also find the application of 
precautionary approaches, conservative estimates, sensitivity analysis and additional studies.   
4.2 Handling uncertainty in the hearing  
Concerning analysis of uncertainty, one participant in the EIA process of Killavaat Alannguat explicitly points 
to a lack of documentation for the validity of results and assessment of the uncertainties: “There seems to 
be a lack of documentation for the validity of results or as a minimum an assessment of the anticipated 
uncertainties” (Jakobsen, 2013, p. 4; emphasis added by author). 
Looking at handling uncertainty, participants in the hearing of Killavaat Alannguat called for the application 
of conservative limit values, the precautionary principle and a worst-case approach. The latter is also 
articulated by a participant in the hearing regarding Aappaluttoq: “WWF further comments that a worst-
case scenario should be described, where there is both a naturally high discharge due to high precipitation 
and an extra discharge due to the project. What will the consequences of this be for the area, and which 
mitigation measures could be applied to limit the negative impacts? (True North Gems, 2014B, p. 144). 
Also, in Aappaluttoq, participants suggest corrections and additions to monitoring and management, for 
example: “WWF recommends that a monitoring programme is prepared as part of the plan for closure, for 
example, a five-year programme, securing monitoring of the areas nature and environment in a period after 
the closure and implementation of rehabilitation” (True North Gems, 2014B, p. 148). It is interesting to note 
that in Killavaat Alannguat, several participants questioned the use of monitoring and control mechanisms; 
whether it works in practice with the anticipated effect. For example, in relation to the water environment: 
”A planned monitoring programme can only give information that something has gone wrong – not remove 
an already occurred pollution” (KANUKOKA, 2013, p. 3). Several participants also ask for clarification of the 
distribution of responsibility if something turns out differently (worse) than expected, for example: “If 
those that have a licence to an area start polluting and threatening the surroundings – what happens then? 
Who will be responsible for the pollution?” (Tittussen, 2013). Thus, the participants questioned the 
outcomes of these tool meant to handle uncertainty by following the development and acting if needed in 
the future when more is known. 
5 Conclusion and discussion  
In the following sections, conclusions are drawn and discussed, structured according to the two research 
questions: 
• Is uncertainty acknowledged in EIA processes and how is it acknowledged? 
• Are tools and approaches used to deal with uncertainty in EIA processes, and which tools and 
approaches are used? 
5.1 Acknowledgement of uncertainty in EIA processes 
One of the studied EIA reports contains explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty phrased as ‘uncertainty’ 
(type A), and two of them contain explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty not phrased as ‘uncertainty’ 
(type B), while all of them implicitly indicated uncertainty (type C). One participant in the hearings explicitly 
raised issues of uncertainty, while in two of the EIA processes, participants indicated uncertainty by asking 
for more information and studies, questioning facts and data, and asking for transparency concerning 
premises.  
The fact that only one of the EIA reports have explicit disclosure of uncertainty of type A and only two of 
type B indicates a low occurrence of acknowledgement given the uncertain trends in the Arctic described in 
section 1. Several studies have found that there is a lack of disclosure of uncertainty in IA reports (e.g. 
Tennøy, Kværner and Gjerstad, 2006; Larsen, Kørnøv and Driscoll, 2013; Lees, 2016). The approach taken in 
this study of counting the number of times uncertainty is disclosed cannot answer the question of whether 
it is disclosed often enough. However, the fact that all three EIA reports contain many indications of 
uncertainty that are not addressed explicitly may indicate that something is missing.   
Nonetheless, as stated in section 1, there is inherent uncertainty associated with all assessment of future 
impacts, and it may not be possible or expedient to deal with all uncertainty at the same level. Thus, there 
is a relevant question of what uncertainty should be made explicit, what should be handled actively and 
what should be left as mere indications: How do practitioners of IA decide how to treat uncertainty, and 
how conscious are they of this choice? Also, as stated in section 3, what are the factors that influence these 
decisions? e.g. legislation, culture, planning system. 
When deciding on whether and to what extent to explicitly acknowledge uncertainty, it is relevant to 
consider how the other participants in the IA process receive such information. Previous studies indicate 
that there are limits to the amount of information on the uncertainty that decision-makers can use. 
According to Wardekker et al. (2008, p. 631), ”policymakers expressed that assessment reports, such as the 
Annual Environmental Balance, should not contain every nuance of uncertainty, but put forward only the 
most relevant messages”. Drawbacks of too much uncertainty disclosure include unnecessary discussion, 
delay in action and the risk of the information being misused selectively and strategically (Wardekker et al., 
2008; Duncan, 2013). However, Wardekker et al. (2008, p. 637) also acknowledge that “nuances in 
information may be obvious to scientists, but not to policy-makers and, therefore, need to be made explicit”.  
One issue of distinguishing between different levels of uncertainty is that of wording, whether to phrase 
uncertainty in those words or not or whether to use ‘unlikely’, ‘probable’, ‘typical’ etc. For example, the EU 
guidance on climate change suggests that uncertainty can be communicated using terms such as ‘strongly 
suspected’ and ‘suspected’ etc. and stresses the importance of defining the wording, for example, using 
probability intervals (European Commission, 2013).  
Taken together, this suggests more research is necessary concerning how the choice of acknowledgement 
and wording is made by IA practitioners as well as how it is perceived by the other involved actors. 
There is not much evidence that uncertainty is an explicit part of the discussions in the EIA process in the 
hearing documents studied. This may be problematic following the argument by Duncan (2013, p. 153-54) 
that there is a need for opportunities for ”deliberation and negotiation of fundamental assumptions and 
parameters before they become embedded in predictive models and obscured from view”. The present 
study, however, does not answer questions of whether such discussions take place internally within the 
team preparing the EIA. 
Several findings of the present study support the call from other authors for the development of typologies 
and terminology for working with uncertainty in IA. As a contribution to this end, an updated framework of 
general sources of uncertainty in IA (see Table 1) is proposed in Table 7. 
Source Description 
Design and technology Uncertainty about the final project design and the choice of technology 
Construction Uncertainty about timelines and methods for construction 
Data Uncertainty about data used as a basis for calculations, prediction and 
assessments e.g. because of questionable data collection, natural variability or 
human behaviour 
Calculations and models Uncertainty about the specific methodology for models, assumptions and 
calculations of impacts 
Causal mechanisms Uncertainty about what the derived consequences of predicted impacts are 
Values Uncertainty about society’s values e.g. expressed through attitudes, classifications 
or goals 
Related activities Uncertainty about the status of related projects, plans and activities etc.  
Implementation  Whether or not the project and mitigation measures are implemented as 
presupposed in the assessment process 
Table 7 Sources of uncertainty in EIA  
5.2 Handling uncertainty in EIA processes 
Various approaches are taken in the EIA reports, which can be part of analysing and handling uncertainty, 
namely sensitivity analysis, monitoring and worst-case estimates. However, it is not clear in the EIA reports 
whether and how the use of these approaches is linked to uncertainty. Only in one instance is uncertainty 
handled systematically, through disclosing levels of confidence in the data used for assessment. Looking to 
the hearings, one participant calls directly for the handling of uncertainty, while others more indirectly call 
for handling uncertainty through the use of conservative limit values, the precautionary principle, and 
worst-case approaches and monitoring. There are also expressions of concern over the usefulness of 
monitoring. Research has also found that there are various methodological problems and poor practice 
concerning monitoring in IA, also in the Arctic (see e.g. Azcárate et al., 2013). 
Previous studies showing a lacking disclosure of uncertainty in IA reports emphasise that the degree of 
treatment of uncertainties is low (e.g. Tennøy, Kværner and Gjerstad, 2006; Larsen, Kørnøv and Driscoll, 
2013; Lees, 2016). This study finds multiple examples of the application of approaches that can be used to 
handle uncertainty, but little evidence that these are used for that purpose. This again raises questions of 
how these choices of whether and how to handle uncertainty are made.  
Generally, it is important to note that it is not necessarily expedient to consider uncertainty as an added 
issue that can make IA processes and reports longer and more resource consuming. However, as evident 
from the results of this as well as previous studies, it may be the case that many of the puzzle pieces 
needed to better acknowledge and handle uncertainty are already present in the process, and what is 
lacking is a more systematic, conscious, transparent and precise use of these pieces.   
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